Following the withdrawal of Israeli forces, a US-led peacekeeping mission entered Lebanon. Friedman depicts them as “good, milk-faced boys” utterly unprepared for the task awaiting them (188). The suggestion for an American force actually came from Arafat, and there had already been a small contingent in August 1982 to oversee the PLO’s withdrawal. After the assassination of Gemayel and the camp massacres, a much larger contingent came with French and Italian soldiers, with the ostensible goal of helping the Lebanese government establish full control. Confident in the rightness of their mission, and cheered by the seemingly warm embrace of the locals, they thought of themselves as exporting American values and institutions. They focused on training a national army, not understanding that Amil Gemayel planned on using that army, and the Americans, to pursue his enemies, not unify the country. He thwarted peace overtures from Shi’a leaders, turned a blind eye to Phalangist violence, and would accept only Israel as a local negotiating partner. Since the Marines were viewed as Gemayel’s enablers, they started coming under attack, with severe restrictions on their ability to fire back. In April 1983, a pickup truck drove to the gate of the US embassy and detonated a bomb.